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CANTARERO   
 
RELIGION IN THE WRITING: A LITERARY ANALYSIS OF 
JUSTICE KENNEDY ON ABORTION 
BY JONATHAN CANTARERO* 
INTRODUCTION 
This article considers the link between religion and rhetoric in 
the writing style of Former Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy. 
During his thirty years on the Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy, a life-
long Catholic, earned a reputation as the pivotal “swing vote” on mor-
ally-charged cases, particularly those involving abortion.1 Given that 
Justice Kennedy often wrote the majority or concurring opinion in these 
cases,2 it is worth considering whether, and to what extent, his religious 
views shaped his legal analysis in authoring those landmark opinions. 
To that end, Part I of this article lays out Justice Kennedy’s Cath-
olic background leading up to his Supreme Court confirmation in 1987.3 
Part II surveys three analytic theories set forth in Anthony Amsterdam’s 
and Jerome Burner’s influential work Minding the Law.4 Calling for a 
heightened consciousness about how judicial decisions are made, their 
book explores judicial texts through the lens of categories, narrative, 
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1 As Justice Kennedy’s former colleague, Justice Elena Kagan has observed, “It is absolutely 
true that in some number of cases every year . . . . we are going to split on pretty predictable 
lines. Four of us who think one thing and four of us who think the other thing and [then] we 
wait and see what Justice Kennedy does.”  Inside the Supreme Court (C-SPAN broadcast Nov. 
4, 2014) https://www.c-span.org/video/?322869-1/discussion-supreme-court-justice-elena-ka-
gan (00:37:43). Examples of opinions authored by Justice Kennedy and decided by split deci-
sion include: Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (Same-sex Discrimination); Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (Abortion Rights; co-authored with Justice 
Souter and Justice O’Connor); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (Death Penalty); Town 
of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014) (Religion and the Establishment Clause), and 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015) (Same-sex Marriage); JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: 
INSIDE  THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 327–29 (2007); BARBARA A. PERRY, THE 
SUPREMES: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 70–71 (2nd ed. 2009). 
2 PERRY, supra note 1, at 68–71. 
3 See infra Part I. 
4 See infra Part II. 
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rhetoric, and culture.5 Parts III–V draw from these categories in review-
ing three landmark opinions by Kennedy on abortion: Akron, Casey, and 
Carhart.6 The article ends with a few tentative conclusions on the degree 
to which Justice Kennedy’s religious views may have shaped his judi-
cial writing style and, thus, the nation’s abortion jurisprudence.7 
I. JUSTICE KENNEDY 
Despite the well-known fact that Justice Kennedy identifies as 
Catholic,8 surprisingly little has been written about his particular reli-
gious beliefs.9 Even scholars who acknowledge this deficiency in the 
literature decline attempts at constructing Kennedy’s theology,10 prefer-
ring instead to assess his opinions against traditional Catholic doctrine.11 
Justice Kennedy himself has never openly espoused his specific reli-
gious views nor has he written an autobiography detailing them.12 Not-
withstanding these limitations, a basic framework is still possible using 
currently available sources.   
Justice Kennedy was raised in a Roman Catholic household in 
Sacramento, California, and eventually served as an altar boy at a local 
church during his adolescent years.13 Nothing indicates that Kennedy 
abandoned, or even considered leaving, the Church at any point before 
                                                            
5 ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 1–16 (2000). Although 
Minding the Law considers four separate literary theories, this article focuses on the first three: 
Categories, narrative, and rhetoric. 
6 See infra Part III–V. 
7 See infra Conclusion. 
8 See Anthony M. Kennedy, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/justices/anthony_m_kennedy (last 
visited Apr. 5, 2020). 
9 Anne Jelliff, Catholic Values, Human Dignity, and the Moral Law in the United States Su-
preme Court: Justice Anthony Kennedy’s Approach to the Constitution, 76 ALB. L. REV. 335, 
336 (2013) (“One aspect of Kennedy, which has been insufficiently discussed, is his Roman 
Catholic faith and the influence that the teachings of the Catholic Church have had on his juris-
prudence”). 
10 Id. at 336. 
11 See, e.g., FRANK J. COLUCCI, JUSTICE KENNEDY’S JURISPRUDENCE: THE FULL AND NECESSARY 
MEANING OF LIBERTY 31-35 (2009) (viewing Kennedy’s jurisprudence as being informed by 
post-Vatican-II documents such as Dignitatis Humanae, but limiting discussion as to Kennedy’s 
actual religious beliefs to a footnote). 
12 The uncertainty of Justice Kennedy’s personal views have likewise extended to his judicial 
philosophy. TOOBIN, supra note 1, at 327 (“Kennedy had come to have a usually predictable, 
if intellectually incoherent, collection of views. He believed what he believed, but it was hard 
to say why”). 
13 PETER IRONS, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT: THE MEN AND WOMEN WHOSE 
CASES AND DECISIONS HAVE SHAPED OUR CONSTITUTION 413 (2006); PERRY, supra note 1, at 
60. 
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he began his legal career.14  Indeed, as Supreme Court commentator Jef-
frey Toobin has noted, Kennedy was, and remains, “a serious Catholic, 
of pre-Vatican II vintage” and one “who went to Mass every Sunday.”15 
Kennedy’s Catholic upbringing quickly became the subject of 
public inquiry following his nomination to the Supreme Court in 1987, 
when scrutiny into his personal views heightened.16 At the time, Presi-
dent Ronald Reagan, who had nominated Kennedy to replace Justice 
Lewis Powell, sought to assure Republicans that Kennedy was “a true 
conservative” who would vote “right” (pun intended) on important 
moral issues.17 Others, however, observed that while Kennedy was an 
open member of the Roman Catholic Church, “his personal views on 
those issues could not be readily determined.”18 Thus, more often than 
not, Justice Kennedy was labeled a moderate conservative and a re-
strained pragmatist which, when coupled with this “courteous” and po-
lite nature, led many to consider him a “conservative but not a right-
wing ideologue.”19 
Further efforts to relate Kennedy’s religious views to his moral 
character can be gleaned from the 1987 confirmation hearings.20 Inter-
estingly, the hearings only provide two references to Kennedy’s Cathol-
icism and its potential impact on his judicial reasoning. Victor Fazio, 
then a representative from California, was the first to reference Ken-
nedy’s Catholicism, portraying his parish involvement as an example of 
community engagement, and likewise, of good moral character.21 This 
remark, however, was limited to one sentence and was later undermined 
by a second reference provided by The National Abortion Rights Action 
League (NARAL).22 Writing for the organization, then-executive direc-
                                                            
14 See e.g., TOOBIN, supra note 1, at 53 (describing Kennedy’s devout Catholic belief). 
15 TOOBIN, supra note 1, at 53. 
16 Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 90 (testimony of 
Anthony M. Kennedy), 1091 (testimony of The National Abortion Rights Action League) 
(1987) [hereinafter Hearings]. 
17 Jelliff, supra note 9, at 335. 
18 Robert Reinhold, Restrained Pragmatist-Anthony McLeod Kennedy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 
1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/11/12/us/man-in-the-news-restrained-pragmatist-an-
thony-m-kennedy.html. 
19 Id. (quoting Professor Robert A. Horn, Kennedy’s professor during his undergraduate years 
at Stanford). 
20 Hearings, supra note 16, at 90 (testimony of Anthony M. Kennedy), 1091 (testimony of The 
National Abortion Rights Action League). 
21 Id. at 12 (testimony of Rep. Vic Fazio). 
22 Id. at 1091 (testimony of The National Abortion Rights Action League); see id. at 12 (testi-
mony of Rep. Vic Fazio). 
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tor Kate Michelman cautioned that Kennedy’s religious ties could influ-
ence his decision-making in controversial cases–particularly those re-
lating to woman’s rights.23 Although Michelman declined to question 
Kennedy’s sincerity when he testified before Congress that he had “no 
set agenda” with respect to abortion rights, she warned “that there may 
nonetheless be significance in Kennedy’s history of pro bono work for 
the Catholic Church.”24 
Ultimately, these concerns proved to be remarkably insignificant 
as Kennedy went on to be confirmed by a vote of 97-to-0, a consensus 
reached in only four out of the last twenty-five confirmation hearings 
since 1969.25 Indeed, this rare bi-partisan harmony would end up fore-
shadowing Kennedy’s future place on the Supreme Court as a consistent 
moderate. Here, President Reagan’s expectation that Kennedy would re-
main a “true conservative” would certainly diminish over time as Ken-
nedy slowly established himself as a “swing vote” in pivotal cases.26 
Given this background, and recognizing Kennedy’s own reluc-
tance to articulate his personal religious beliefs, this article assumes for 
purposes of the foregoing analysis that Kennedy’s religious views have 
more or less remained in accordance with traditional Catholic doctrine.27 
The notion, for example, that Kennedy was and remains personally 
against abortion is strongly suggested not only through some of his ear-
liest opinions on the Court,28 but by various investigative reports as 
well.29 Kennedy himself alluded to this immediately before Ohio v. Ak-
ron Center was decided, when, in a handwritten letter to Justice Black-
man, he confessed that he was “still struggling with the whole abortion 
                                                            
23 Id. at 1084, 1091 (testimony of The National Abortion Rights Action League). 
24 Id. at 1091 (testimony of The National Abortion Rights Action League). 
25 See Supreme Court Nominations (Present-1789), UNITED STATES SENATE, 
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/nominations/SupremeCourtNominations1789present.htm 
(last visited Apr. 6, 2020); see also IRONS, supra note 13, at 553. 
26 See Jelliff, supra note 9, at 335; see supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
27 See COLUCCI, supra note 11, at 31–35. 
28 See generally Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Hodgson v. Minne-
sota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990) (Ken-
nedy writing the majority). 
29 See, e.g., TOOBIN, supra note 1, at 53. As one book noted: 
  …[Kennedy] prayed in the old- fashioned manner, hands clasped before him. Abortion re-
pelled him. He fully adopted his church’s teachings on the subject. Once before he joined the 
Court, he had called Roe the “Dred Scott of our time,” a reference to the infamous 1857 ruling 
that sanctioned slavery and helped spark the Civil War. 
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issue.”30 Indeed, as we shall see, Kennedy subtly suggested his adher-
ence to a more conservative moral stance in cloaked sections of Casey 
and Carhart as well.31 
II. ANALYTIC THEORIES 
In order to properly analyze Justice Kennedy’s abortion juris-
prudence, Part II of this article provides three analytic approaches to 
reading judicial opinions, as adopted from Amsterdam’s and Burner’s 
Minding the Law.32 In particular, this section discusses the analysis of 
judicial opinions through the lens of category, narrative, and rhetoric.33 
Category: The first approach, judicial opinions as category, 
views such opinions as thematic products designed to persuade a partic-
ular audience.34 In that sense, judges frame their cases to fit within an 
identifiable category or theme in order to tap into a reader’s cognitive 
assumptions and intuitions about those types of subject matter.35 Thus, 
under this view, a reader’s willingness to adopt a judge’s position on a 
particular case hinges on the judge’s ability to engage the reader in a 
relatable narrative. Amsterdam and Bruner suggest that, within the con-
text of judicial opinions, three types of categories are most prevalent: 
“natural theoretical,” “human narrative,” and “supernatural religious.”36 
An opinion which fits in the “natural theoretical” category is 
both fact-based and empirical.37 It is “natural” because it is based on 
plain observations. It is “theoretical” because it requires a way of ration-
alizing those observations. The category is also “fact-based” because 
the “theory” or “narrative” used must be “verifiable or at least falsifia-
ble.” 38 This empirical approach, while perhaps “dry” in its substance, is 
meant to create an account of the facts which, when analyzed under the 
applicable law, creates an irrefutable logic-based proof (i.e., if you have 
                                                            
30 See COLUCCI, supra note 11, at 46 (quoting Blackmun Papers, Box 544, Folder 2 (letter 
dated June 21, 1990)) (on file with Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, 
D.C.)). 
31 See infra Part IV–V. 
32 See infra note 23 and accompanying text. 
33 See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 5, at 1–16. A fourth approach, judicial texts as 
culture, is also considered in chapters 8–9 but is not discussed here. 
34 Marie-Claire Belleau & Rebecca Johnson, I Beg to Differ: Interdisciplinary Questions 
About Law, Language, and Dissent, in LAW, MYSTERY & THE HUMANITIES: COLLECTED 
ESSAYS 145, 146–47 (Logan Atkinson & Diana Majury eds., 2008). 
35 See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 5, at 31–32. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 29–30. 
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X then you can prove Y; facts A, B, and C clearly show X, therefore Y 
must have occurred). 
The second category, “human narrative,” on the other hand, is 
based not on objective truth, but rather the appearance of truth.39 Here, 
the judge writes an opinion by constructing a factual narrative that fits 
within one of society’s “stock stories” (i.e., the “the evil corporation” or 
the “innocent bystander”). 40 In that lens, the degree to which a judge 
can successfully mimic these “stock stories” correlates with the reader’s 
receptiveness of the case to his or her own experiences, biases, and con-
ceptions of right and wrong. But while this fabricated familiarity may 
make it easier to accept the judge’s version of the case, the approach can 
easily turn into an argumentum ad passiones, or a mere “appeal to emo-
tion.”41 
Finally, where the category is “religious supernatural,” the judge 
seeks to construct a “normative-religious” account of the facts.42 Here, 
“normative” means ordinary everyday facts backed up by an assumed 
understanding of some higher order.43 Thus, authority is not based on 
verification (i.e., “natural theoretical”) or verisimilitude (i.e., “human 
narrative”), but on the author’s capacity “to enlist belief as an act of 
faith.”44 As Amsterdam and Bruner note, an opinion within this category 
typically sets the tone as one of “human origins, human destiny, human 
responsibilities, and human plight.”45 Of course, these are the “big ques-
tions” that the reader is least likely to understand. Accordingly, the re-
sulting expectation is that the reader will simply defer to the judge’s 
wisdom rather than rely on his or her own limited understanding of what 
may be essentially a metaphysical issue.46 
Notably, the potential to use the “religious supernatural” cate-
gory seems particularly apparent in cases where religion is the issue or 
where the author is religiously observant. Because the foremost concern 
in this article is the interplay between personal religious views and legal 
reasoning, Kennedy’s opinions provide fertile ground to explore this 
type of category. 
                                                            
39 See BELLEAU & JOHNSON, supra note 34, at 147. 
40 Id. at 153. 
41 Michael C. Labossiere, Fallacy: Appeal to Emotion, THE NIZKOR PROJECT (1995), 
http://www.nizkor.com/features/fallacies/. 
42 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 5, at 32. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
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Narrative: A second analytical approach views judicial texts 
purely as narrative. Amsterdam and Bruner provide the following defi-
nition: 
A narrative can purport to be either a fiction or real account of 
events; it does not have to specify which. It needs a cast of human-like 
characters, being capable or willing their own actions, forming inten-
tions, holding beliefs, having feelings. It also needs a plot with a begin-
ning, a middle, and an end, in which particular characters are involved 
in particular events. The unfolding of the plot requires (implicitly or ex-
plicitly): 
(1) an initial steady state grounded in the legitimate ordinariness 
of things 
(2) that gets disrupted by a Trouble consisting of circumstances 
attributable to human agency or susceptible to change by human inter-
vention, 
(3) in turn evoking efforts at redress or transformation, which 
succeed or fail, 
(4) so that the old steady state is restored or a new (transformed) 
steady state is created, 
(5) and the story concludes by drawing the then-and-there of the 
tale that has been told into the here-and-now of the telling through some 
coda…[such as a moral of the story].47 
Unsurprisingly, then, although categories and narrative may cut 
across each other and even masquerade as one another at times, narra-
tive generally functions as the larger scheme while utilizing categories 
to help paint the picture.48 Narratives work best in cases where the liti-
gants are real people (i.e., in a murder case) as opposed to large corpo-
rations (i.e., in an anti-trust case) because the facts more easily translate 
into a compelling “storyline.” Thus, a judge may write for the majority 
utilizing a particular narrative (i.e., religion holds a special status in our 
country so Mean Principle Mike should not prevent Happy Student Har-
old from forming an after school Jewish Club) by employing various 
categories (i.e., the ill-spirited atheist [human-narrative] or religion as 
sacred [religious-supernatural]). 
The larger task of developing a narrative, likewise, requires a 
particularized articulation of the “facts of the case.” Consequently, a 
method that reads judicial opinions as narrative seeks to understand a 
judge’s recitation of the “relevant facts” as influenced, if not dictated, 
                                                            
47 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 5, at 113–14. 
48 Id. at 12. 
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by the particular narrative employed. 49 What the facts “really” are and 
how they are applied thereby hinge on the narrative an author seeks to 
develop.50 This art of constructing a narrative brings us to our final ap-
proach to reading judicial text, rhetoric. 
Rhetoric: Rhetoric, generally construed, “. . .denote[s] the vari-
ous linguistic processes by which a speaker can create, address, avoid, 
or shape issues. . .”51 Rhetorical discourse can likewise be interpreted 
“. . .as seeking to regulate an audience’s conception of a subject and its 
definition of the issues attending that subject.”52 In other words, it is the 
craft of persuasion. Engaging in rhetorical discourse requires a speaker 
to choose words to the exclusion of alternatives in order convey pre-
cisely that which they hope to communicate.53 This reality resonates 
with Amsterdam and Bruner’s axiomatic statement that “. . . what is said 
to be meant by what is said depends on what is perceived to be going 
on.”54 Put differently: context matters. 
The founder of analytical jurisprudence, John Austin, distin-
guished three dimensions of linguistic expression that helps illustrate 
this point: the locutionary dimension, the illocutionary dimension, and 
the perlocutionary dimension.55 As interpreted by Amsterdam and 
Bruner, “the locutionary dimension is the propositional content of [any] 
utterance consisting,” in its simplest form, “of a reference to some sub-
ject . . . and a predication about that subject.”56  Thus, in the statement 
“He just applied for a job at McDonalds,” “He” functions as the subject 
while “just applied for job at McDonalds” serves as the predicate. 
The illocutionary dimension, on the other hand, refers to what 
the speaker is doing with the utterance.57 This can range from merely 
“stating,” “describing,” and “asserting” to “warning,” “questioning,” or 
                                                            
49 Id. at 111; see also Jerome Bruner, What Is A Narrative Fact?, 560 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. 
& SOC. SCI. 17, 18 (1998). 
50 Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEX. L. REV. 381, 387 (1989). 
51 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 5, at 165. 
52 EDWIN BLACK, RHETORICAL QUESTIONS: STUDIES OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE 153 (1992). 
53  See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY 29 (2003) (“ ob-
serving that the rhetorical approach belongs to the tradition of the ancient sophists, who were 
‘not interested in discovering truth’ but instead in ‘crafting persuasive appeals to the imperfect 
understanding, the opinions and even the prejudices, of particular audiences’”); Anthony T. 
Kronman, Rhetoric, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 677 (1999) (“Rhetoric is the art of persuading people to 
believe things”); John W. Cooley, A Classical Approach to Mediation-Part i: Classicial Rheto-
ric and the Art of Persuasion in Mediation, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 83 (1993). 
54 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 5, at 167. 
55 Id.; J.L. AUSTIN, HOW  TO  DO THINGS WITH WORDS 108–09 (1962). 
56 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 5, at 167. 
57 Id. 
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“commanding.”58 In the example above, the utterance appears to func-
tion as a mere “statement” but could easily change to a “question” (if 
someone had asked where Mark was) or a warning (if someone said they 
were referring Mark for a job at Wendy’s). 
Finally, the perlocutionary dimension refers to the effects of the 
utterance on the intended audience and hinges both on context and the 
illocutionary dimension previously discussed.59 Take, for example, the 
following exchange: 
Listener: I just took the same Bar Exam as you and Mark, did 
you think it was tough? 
Speaker: He just applied for a job at McDonalds. 
Here, the speaker’s fundamental objective is to answer the lis-
tener’s question although not necessarily in the most direct manner. The 
illocutionary intention of the utterance is, apparently, to warn or scare 
the listener while the perlocutionary consequence is likely that the lis-
tener is now “concerned,” “intimidated,” or even “frightened” by the bar 
exam. The lesson here is that listeners and readers are often not given 
the most straightforward response to a question or comment. In other 
words, what the speaker “means” is not always readily ascertainable 
from a mere locutionary understanding of the utterance but requires 
some internal processing on the part of the listener or reader to “make 
sense” of the utterance. This, however, does not necessarily make such 
rhetorical utterances any more difficult to understand. On the contrary, 
such responses often function as psychologically appealing short-cuts 
for conveying information in a more vivid manner. Thus, with respect 
to the last example: 
Utterance: “He just applied for a job at McDonalds” 
Translation: “The test was so difficult that not only had Mark 
lost all hope of passing it and being admitted to the bar but his self-
esteem was so low despite his educational background that he felt he 
was only qualified to work for minimum wage in a fast-food restaurant.”   
Rhetoricians take advantage of our innate ability to process in-
formation through inferences and implications by employing various 
rhetorical devices disguised in ordinary language.60 In a legal setting, 
and in particular in the context of judicial writing, this translates to a 
system in which the illocutionary dimension of legal discourse (what 
judges are doing when they write a particular passage in an opinion) 
                                                            
58 See id 
59 Id. at 168. 
60 See supra text accompanying notes 51–59. 
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functions as a means for advancing their perlocutionary aim of persuad-
ing their audience to accept the written rationale for the outcome of any 
given case. In simpler terms, a judge’s skill is “[knowing] how to say 
something without thereby taking the responsibility of having said it,” 
in order to reap the full benefits of “the efficacy of speech and the inno-
cence of silence.”61 Given that countless rhetorical devices exist, we will 
focus on two classifications highlighted by Amsterdam and Bruner: On-
tological construction techniques and epistemological construction 
techniques.62 
Ontology is “a branch of metaphysics concerned with the nature 
and relations of being.”63 Ontological construction techniques, thus, 
serve to alter or modify our conception of reality.64  An example of this 
is the “framing” that takes place in the first few paragraphs of all judicial 
opinions. It is here where judges often set the tone that supports the rea-
soning that follows. Take, for instance, a criminal appeal in which the 
judge rules in favor of the defendant. No matter how gruesome or col-
orful the facts, if the judge frames the case in a procedural context, refers 
to the parties formally as “the people” and “the defendant,” and recites 
facts in board strokes rather than in gory detail, readers will have a 
harder time sympathizing with the victims. Why? Because in writing the 
opinion this way the judge forces the reader to subconsciously deper-
sonalize the parties and become increasingly emotionally detached. 
Here, subtle changes in language, such as adding “allegedly” before oth-
erwise damning facts and using ultra-technical jargon, all serve to divert 
the reader from “reading in” a gruesome narrative that would convince 
any twelve-person jury of a defendant’s guilt. 
Related to, but distinct from, ontology is epistemology which 
focuses on “the nature and grounds of knowledge especially with refer-
ence to its limits and validity.”65 Unsurprisingly, then, epistemological 
construction techniques work to alter the certainty or scope of our 
knowledge of reality by “mak[ing] facts appear more or less certain and 
                                                            
61 Id. at 175, 382–83 n. 24 (citing OSWALD DUCROT, DIRE ET NE PAS DIRE: PRINCIPES DE 
SEMANTIQUE LINQUISTIQUE 12 (1972)). 
62 See id. at 177. Minding the Law also includes a third (“story telling”) and fourth (“catch-all”) 
category. See id. We considered the “story telling technique” in discussing the second analytical 
approach, judicial texts as narrative, see, supra text accompanying notes 37-40, and will borrow 
from “catch-all” category during our analysis of Kennedy’s opinions, see infra at Part III. 
63 Ontology, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/diction-
ary/ontology (last visited Apr. 7, 2020). 
64 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 5, at 177. 
65 Epistemology, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/diction-
ary/epistemology (last visited Apr. 7, 2020) (emphasis added). 
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[opening or closing] the range of admissible interpretative possibili-
ties.”66 
One example of this is to include questioning modifiers (“al-
leged,” “asserted,” “presumed” or “conceded”) before unfavorable facts 
to denote the possibility that the information presented in the case is in 
fact false. Other rhetorical devices work in the same way to either open 
up certain options or close others. Mental verbs (“I think”, “I imagine”), 
hedges (“generally,” “basically”), and qualifying adverbs (“seemingly,” 
approximately,” “possibly”), for example, all serve to “qualify the force 
of our assertions and conclusions.”67 Auxiliary verbs (“could have” and 
“should have”) function in a similar way to suggest an alternative or 
better course of action that ought to have taken place.68 This allows 
judges to sneak in their own views as to the rightfulness or wrongfulness 
of a party’s actions without flat-out saying “this is what I would have 
done.” A variety of other expressions exist as well, each with the effect 
of detracting from certainty, or diluting the veracity of any given prop-
osition.69 
Given these various techniques, it is important to note that while 
these analytic theories are somewhat distinct, they often overlap and 
work off of each other in very fluid and organic ways.70 This is some-
thing to keep in mind as we begin exploring Justice Kennedy’s abortion 
jurisprudence, beginning with his first opinion on the subject in Ohio v. 
Akron Center.71 
III. OHIO V. AKRON CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Akron represented Kennedy’s 
first opportunity to write a majority opinion on abortion as an Associate 
Justice.72  Although the case was decided when Kennedy had just under 
two years on the bench, Kennedy had already established a record of 
voting with conservatives on these types of cases.73 The first example of 
this was Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, a 1989 case involving 
a Missouri law that required physicians to test for fetal age before per-
forming an abortion if they had reason to believe the fetus was twenty 
                                                            
66 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 5, at 184. 
67 Id. at 184 (quoting STEPHEN E. TOULMIN, THE USES OF ARGUMENT 75 (1958)). 
68 Id. 
69 See id. 
70 See Logic and Ontology, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., https://plato.stanford.edu/en-
tries/logic-ontology/#AreOve (last updated Oct. 11, 2017). 
71 497 U.S. 502, 506 (1990). 
72 See id. 
73 See Anthony M. Kennedy, supra note 8. 
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weeks or older.74 A bare majority, which included Justice Kennedy, up-
held the requirement as being reasonable in light of “the State’s interest 
in protecting potential human life.”75 
The second case, decided the following year and on the same 
day as Akron, was Hodgson v. Minnesota.76 This case involved a Min-
nesota statute requiring “two-parent notification” of abortion decisions 
of minors unless they obtained a judicial bypass.77 Although agreeing 
with the judgment affirming the notification provision when accompa-
nied by the judicial bypass mechanism, 78 Kennedy went further in a 
separate concurrence arguing that the statute was valid even in absence 
of any judicial bypass provision.79 
Having sided with conservatives in Webster and Hodgson, Ken-
nedy was poised to follow suit in Akron. On appeal from the Sixth Cir-
cuit, the suit involved then-pregnant Rachael Roe who had been denied 
an abortion from the Akron Center for Reproductive Health Services 
(Akron Center) based on Ohio’s new one-parent notification law.80 At 
the time of the suit, Rachael was a single minor dependent on her par-
ents.81 Similar to the “two-parent” notification requirement in Hodgson, 
the statute in Akron required Rachael to notify at least one of her parents 
before obtaining an abortion; it also included a similar “judicial bypass” 
exception.82 In an effort to keep her decision private, however, Rachael 
declined to use either avenue.83 Her attending doctor at Akron Center, 
Dr. Gaujean, was thus forced to turn her away or otherwise subject him-
self to criminal penalties.84 
                                                            
74 Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 513 (1989). 
75 Id. at 519–20. 
76 Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 417 (1990). 
77 Id. at 420. 
78 See id. at 481 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
79 Id. at 481 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Although brief, Kennedy’s 
concurrence previews language that appears in Casey and Carhart. See COLUCCI, supra note 
11, at 43. 
80 See Stephanie R. Bryant, Constitutional Law—Due Process: Minor’s Abortion Right—
Ohio’s Parental Notification Statute—An Anti-Abortion Statute in Disguise? Ohio v. Akron 
Center for Reproductive Health, 27 LAND & WATER L. REV. 605, 605 (1992). 
81 Id. 
82 See id. at 605–06, 621. 
83 See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 512 (1990). 
84 See id. at 509, 533 (“The physician risks civil damages, criminal penalties, including impris-
onment, as well as revocation of his license for disobeying the statute’s commands.”); see also 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.85(B)(1) (West 2020); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.12(D)-(E) 
(West 2020); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(B)(23) (West 2020). 
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Chief Justice Rehnquist assigned the opinion to Justice Kennedy 
who spent little time deciding how to vote on the case and began circu-
lating drafts of an opinion upholding the “one-parent notification” stat-
ute shortly after oral arguments.85 On the verge of going 0-for-3 in these 
three cases, liberal Justice Blackmun circulated a colorful dissent criti-
cizing Kennedy’s rhetoric in his preliminary draft of Akron: “[Ken-
nedy’s] hyperbole…can have but one purpose: to further incite an 
American press, public and pulpit already inflamed by the pronounce-
ment made by a plurality of this Court last Term in Webster.”86 
Kennedy quickly responded to the Justice’s concerns in a private 
handwritten letter dated June 21, 1990: 
 
Dear Harry, 
After much hesitation, I decided it best for our 
collegial relation and, I hope, mutual respect to tell you 
that I harbor deep resentment at your paragraph on page 
17 in Ohio v. Akron Center. You say my hyperbole is to 
incite an inflamed public. To write with that purpose 
would be a violation of my judicial duty. 
I am still struggling with the whole abortion issue 
and thought it proper to convey this in what I wrote.87 
 
The crux of this impassioned exchange centered on Part V of 
Kennedy’s initial draft.88 Alluding to the potential impact on the reli-
gious community, for example, Blackmun was not amused by Ken-
nedy’s “paternalistic” and “philosophic[al]” language in that section 
which broke dramatically in style and substance from the rest of the 
opinion.89 With neither Blackmun nor Kennedy willing to budge, how-
ever, both ultimately left most of their respective homilies intact in the 
final opinion.90 For Kennedy’s part, his insistence on including this 
                                                            
85  COLUCCI, supra note 11, at 45-47. 
86 Id. at 47 (citing Blackmun Papers, Box 544, Folder 3 (draft, p. 17) (on file with Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.)). 
87 Id. at 45-47 (citing Blackmun Papers, Box 544, Folder 2 (letter dated June 21, 1990) (on file 
with Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.)). 
88 See Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 541 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
89 See Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 541 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The plurality 
indulges in paternalistic comments about ‘‘profound philosophic choices”). 
90 For Justice Kennedy, see id. at 519–20 (Kennedy, J., opinion); HELEN J. KNOWLES, THE TIE 
GOES TO FREEDOM: JUSTICE ANTHONY M. KENNEDY ON LIBERTY 179 (2009) (“the language of 
Part V went unchanged from start to finish”). For Justice Blackmun, compare COLUCCI supra 
note 11, at 48 (citing Blackmun Papers, Box 544, Folder 2 (draft, p. 17) (letter of 21 June 1990), 
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more controversial language, which we examine in greater detail below, 
resulted in a two-tiered structure in which Parts I–IV of Akron remained 
remarkably unexceptional in style and content but Part V stood out for 
its probative and provocative language.91 
Unfortunately for Justice Kennedy the sharp differences be-
tween Justice Blackmun and himself concerning Part V of the opinion 
were also reflected in the final outcome of the case.92 Five Justices even-
tually joined Parts I–IV of Akron to form a six-three majority upholding 
the “one-parent notification” requirement.93 However, only three Jus-
tices joined Part V, constituting merely a plurality of the Court.94 These 
divisive results beg the question as to why Kennedy felt the need to in-
clude Part V in the final opinion at all. At least two explanations exist. 
From a purely jurisprudential point of view, Justice Kennedy’s 
inclusion and framing of Part V suggests that he was generally more 
concerned with its future impact rather than its immediate relevance to 
the litigants in Akron.95 To begin, Part V obscured the applicable legal 
principle for future abortion cases by referencing both the “rational ba-
sis” test used in Webster and the “undue burden” test advocated by Jus-
tice O’Connor a few years earlier in City of Akron v. Akron Center for 
Reproductive Health.96 Having appeared first in O’Connor’s 1983 dis-
sent, and now in Akron’s plurality opinion, Kennedy moved the Court 
one step closer towards fully embracing the “undue burden” test in a 
majority opinion as it eventually did in Casey.97 This ideological shift 
also represented Justice Kennedy’s earliest efforts to alter Roe v. 
Wade’s98 constitutional foundation from “privacy” to “liberty” which 
                                                            
with Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 541 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (only changing 
the term “purpose” for “result”). 
91 See KNOWLES, supra note 90, at 178, and compare Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 
at 507–19 (Part I-IV), with Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 519–20 (Part V). 
92 See Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 519–20. 
93 Id. at 506, 520. Although the Court held the statute valid when coupled with the judicial 
bypass mechanism, it ultimately left open the question of whether the judicial bypass was “re-
quired.” Id. at 510. 
94 Id. at 506. Part V of Akron was joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, and 
Justice Scalia. Id. 
95 See COLUCCI, supra note 11, at 44. 
96 See Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 519–20. Justice O’Connor first articulated an 
early version of the undue burden test in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 
Inc., as an alternative to Roe’s trimester framework. 462 U.S. 416, 459, 463–64 (1983) (O’Con-
nor, J., dissenting). 
97 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992). 
98 410 U.S. 113 (1973) holding modified by Casey, 505 U.S. at 878–79 
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was much more consistent with his own jurisprudential philosophy con-
cerning individual rights.99 
Aside from these jurisprudential considerations, a second expla-
nation is gleaned from Justice Kennedy’s exchange with Justice 
Blackmun.100 It is in this correspondence that Kennedy reveals his own 
personal “struggle” to reconcile abortion rights with his personal views 
on the subject.101 What is truly fascinating, however, is not that Kennedy 
admits that this struggle exists but that he confesses his express intention 
to “. . . convey this in what [he] wrote.”102 Given, Kennedy’s Catholi-
cism, the analysis that follows suggests that his rhetoric in Akron can 
also be understood as illustrating Kennedy’s effort to reconcile his per-
sonal religious views–whether consciously or subconsciously–with his 
larger role as a Supreme Court Justice. 
PART III-B: KENNEDY’S VOICE IN AKRON 
Justice Kennedy begins Part I of Akron with a rather unexciting 
restatement of the Ohio “one-parent notification” statute, detailing all of 
its exceptions.103 Consider the beginning of the first few paragraphs: 
The Ohio Legislature, in November 1985, enacted 
Amended Substitute House Bill 319 (H.B. 319) [making] 
it a criminal offense, except in four specified circum-
stances, for a physician or other person to perform an 
abortion on an unmarried and unemancipated woman un-
der 18 years of age…. 
The first and second circumstances in which a physician 
may perform an abortion relate to parental notice and 
consent…. 
The third and fourth circumstances depend on a judicial 
procedure that allows a minor to bypass the notice and 
consent…. 
                                                            
99 See generally KNOWLES, supra note 90, at 19–51 (discussing Justice Kennedy’s jurispru-
dence in light of libertarian views); COLUCCI, supra note 11, at 43–48. As Colucci notes, framing 
the standard as one which protects women against an undue burden imposed by the State implies 
a value on individual liberty and autonomy consisted with Justice Kennedy’s own evolving lib-
ertarian jurisprudence. Id. at 44. 
100 See COLUCCI, supra note 11, at 45–48. 
101 See id. at 47–48 (quoting Blackmun Papers, Box 544, Folder 2 (letter dated June 21, 
1990)) (on file with Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.)). 
102 See COLUCCI, supra note 11, at 47–48 (quoting Blackmun Papers, Box 544, Folder 2 (letter 
dated June 21, 1990)) (on file with Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, 
D.C.)). 
103 Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 506–10 (1990). 
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The juvenile court must hold a hearing at the earliest pos-
sible time, but not later than the fifth business day after 
the minor files the complaint….104 
Part II follows an analogous pattern, diving into a textbook ap-
plication of the case law, while Parts III and IV address counter argu-
ments.105 Throughout his discussion in Parts I–IV, Justice Kennedy 
gives little mention to Rachael Roe’s specific factual situation, never 
examines the history of abortion-limiting laws, never references any so-
cial science data concerning abortions, and never cites to an amicus brief 
in his reasoning.106 His opinion, at least up to Part IV, is thus, structured, 
formal, and somewhat boring.   
Taking a page from Amsterdam and Bruner, it is easy to see how 
Kennedy’s dry and perhaps academic style in Parts I–IV of Akron fits 
within a larger “natural-theoretical” approach to judicial opinion writ-
ing. Kennedy’s language in Part I is “natural” because it is descriptive 
and straightforward while Parts II–IV are “theoretical” in that they es-
sentially constitute one large IRAC.107 This, in turn, enables readers to 
verify and corroborate Kennedy’s rationale before deciding whether to 
“agree” or “accept” his ultimate conclusion. But Justice Kennedy goes 
one step further and supplements this “natural-theoretical” framework 
with ontological construction techniques that “frame” or “center” the 
case as one focused on “procedure” rather than “persons.” 
Take Justice Kennedy’s use of the litigants, for example. To 
begin, Kennedy refers to Rachael Roe and Dr. Gaujean by name only 
once in the entire opinion.108 Second, this introduction comes only after 
an almost three-page discussion of Ohio law.109 Both of these features 
force readers to focus on the mechanical aspects of the statute rather 
than on the individual stories of the litigants. Third, Kennedy continues 
to depersonalize these individuals by generically referring to the parties 
as “the State” and “Appellees” for the rest of the opinion.110 Even here, 
any mention of the actual parties is dominated by repeated references to 
                                                            
104 Id. at 507–08. 
105 See id. at 510–19. 
106 See id. at 507–19. 
107 IRAC is an acronym for ‘‘issue, role (or relevant law), application (or analysis), and con-
clusion’’: a method used in composing certain legal documents and reports. Richard Norquist, 
IRAC Method of Legal Writing, THOUGHTCO. (Aug. 12, 2019), 
https://www.thoughtco.com/irac-legal-writing-1691083. 
108 Id. at 509. 
109 See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 507–09 (1990). 
110 See id. at 509–20. 
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“procedure[s]” (thirty times in Parts I–IV) and “require[ments]” (thirty-
one times in Parts I–IV).111 
Notice how these rhetorical devices gear audiences away from 
reading in any “human-narrative” into the opinion. In this vein, Justice 
Kennedy’s omissions function in much the same manner. Kennedy, for 
example, excludes Rachael’s allegations of parental abuse; 112 does not 
address the prevalence and psychological impact of physical and sexual 
abuse by parents despite its inclusion in the Appellees’ brief;113 and fails 
to mention the harsh criminal penalties that would have attached to Dr. 
Gaujean had he induced the abortion without complying with the stat-
ute.114 Thus, just as the emphasis on “procedure” over “persons” leads 
readers to stoically assess the case so does the absence of any narrative 
cues hinder them from “sympathizing” with Rachael Roe and Dr. Gau-
jean on any personal level. 
Whether this rhetoric actually convinces lay readers to side with 
the State is a question outside the scope of this article. What we do 
know, however, is that Justice Kennedy’s persuasive writing was suffi-
cient to cobble together five additional votes with respect to Parts I–IV 
of the opinion.115 Indeed, it is possible that, given his short tenure on the 
Court at the time, Kennedy consciously adopted minimally controver-
sial language in order to gain the support of his colleges, including Jus-
tice O’Connor (a swing vote at the time) and Justice Stevens (arguably 
the most liberal Justice on the Rehnquist Court).   
Yet the looming question of how exactly this relates to Justice 
Kennedy’s Catholicism remains. As Kennedy’s exchange with 
Blackmun suggests, Parts I–IV must be read together with Part V which 
only garnered three additional votes, and is therefore not part of the con-
trolling rationale. Despite its relegated status, however, Part V is the 
only section in Akron mentioning a rule.116 Indeed, Kennedy’s ambigu-
ity as to which rule is being applied (he mentions both Webster’s “ra-
                                                            
111 See id. at 507–19. 
112 See Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health v. Rosen, 633 F. Supp. 1123, 1127 (N.D. Ohio 1986), 
amended by 110 FRD 576 (N.D. Ohio 1986) and affd sub nom. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health 
v. Slaby, 854 F.2d 852 (6th Cir. 1988), rev’d sub nom. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 
502 (1990). 
113 Brief for Appellee at 12–14, Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (No. 88-805), 
1989 WL 1127539, at *8–9. 
114 See Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 533 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2151.85(B)(1) (West 2020); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.12(D)-(E) (West 
2020); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(B)(23) (West 2020). 
115 See Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 505. 
116 See Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 519–20. 
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tionality” test and O’Connor’s “undue burden” test) may, in part, ac-
count for its plurality status.117 In addition, Part V also probes into the 
larger metaphysical questions surrounding abortion rights, the framing 
of which resonates with traditional Catholic doctrine.118 Thus, although 
not part of the holding, Part V’s rhetoric may provide greater support 
for viewing Kennedy’s, larger “struggl[e] with the whole abortion is-
sue”119 as influenced by his religion. Consider the following passage: 
A free and enlightened society may decide that each of its mem-
bers should attain a clearer, more tolerant understanding of the profound 
philosophic choices confronted by a woman who is considering whether 
to seek an abortion. Her decision will embrace her own destiny and per-
sonal dignity, and the origins of the other human life that lie within the 
embryo.120 
In addition to sounding like a theology textbook, Justice Ken-
nedy’s word choice here (“profound philosophical choices,” “destiny,” 
and “origins of other human life”) is miles apart from the dry, procedural 
language in the preceding twelve pages of the opinion. Consequently, 
Kennedy’s almost spiritual discourse breaks away from his “natural the-
oretical” approach to judicial writing and creeps into the “religious su-
pernatural” realm. Recall that where the category is “religious supernat-
ural,” judges seek to construct a “normative religious” account of the 
case where ordinary everyday facts are backed up by an assumed under-
standing of some higher order.121 Transitioning from the locutionary di-
mension to the illocutionary dimension, readers see the following take 
place: 
Warning/Assertion: “[A] woman who is considering whether to 
seek an abortion [is confronted by] profound philosophic choices. . . . 
Her decision will embrace her own destiny and personal dignity, and the 
origins of the other human life that lie within the embryo.”122 
                                                            
117 Particularly interesting here is the fact that Justice O’Connor did not sign on to Part V of the 
opinion despite its inclusion of “undue burden” language. See id. at 506, 519–20. Colucci sug-
gests several factors may have influenced this decision including: (1) O’Connor’s tendency to 
write separately; (2) Part V’s equivocation of “rational basis” and “undue burden”; and (3) Part 
V’s paternalistic and patriarchal language concerning minors and women in general which 
O’Connor may have found offensive or at least unnecessary. See COLUCCI, supra note 11, at 45. 
118 See COLUCCI, supra note 11, at 72 (stating “Much of [Kennedy’s] rhetoric about human 
dignity, liberty, and postabortion regret resonates with the language of papal statements issued 
after Vatican II . . .”). 
119 Id. at 47–48 (quoting Blackmun Papers, Box 544, Folder 2 (letter dated June 21, 1990)) 
(on file with Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.)). 
120 Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 520 (emphasis added). 
121 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 5, at 32. 
122 Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 520. 
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Translation: Even if you disagree with everything I just said…in 
the end these choices are way too deep, important, and even – dare I say 
– spiritual, for us, (especially me) and these woman to fully understand. 
Consider, next, how Justice Kennedy uses this “philosophical” 
language to set up his final point in the opinion: 
Assertion: The State is entitled to assume that, for most of its 
people, the beginnings of that understanding will be within the family, 
society’s most intimate association. It is both rational and fair for the 
State to conclude that, in most instances, the family will strive to give a 
lonely or even terrified minor advice that is both compassionate and 
mature…. It would deny all dignity to the family to say that the State 
cannot take this reasonable step…to ensure that, in most cases, a young 
woman will receive guidance and understanding from a parent.123 
Translation: If these questions are too deep for me, they are cer-
tainly too deep and confusing for these girls, at least in most cases. It 
makes sense, then, that these girls receive the support, love, and guid-
ance only a parent can give. I have faith that parents will provide just 
that kind of support, in most cases, if given the opportunity (i.e., if mi-
nors are forced to ask for it). 
There are several important working pieces in these two short 
passages. To begin, in the first passage Kennedy presents the larger so-
cial issues attending abortion not as “medical,” or “psychological” in 
nature but as “moral” and “philosophical.” This approach feeds into a 
“religious supernatural” reading of Part V and betrays Kennedy’s own 
internal “struggle” to reconcile his personal views with his role as a Su-
preme Court justice – something Kennedy finds a real challenge based 
on his exchange with Justice Blackmun.124 
Second, Kennedy continues to limit any “human narrative” to 
one focused on the family rather than the actual minor facing the deci-
sion.  Here, Kennedy litters his reasoning with paternalistic language 
(“the beginnings of . . . understanding will be within the fam-
ily”…”lonely,” and “terrified minor[s],” need “compassionate and ma-
ture” “advice”) that ultimately betrays his own conceptions of normalcy 
within the home.125 This conception, in turn, is likely influenced by his 
unremarkable upbringing in a traditional two-parent Catholic house-
hold.126 Indeed, Blackmun calls Kennedy out on this in his dissent: 
                                                            
123 Id. (emphasis added). 
124 See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text. 
125 Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 520. 
126 See Anthony M. Kennedy, supra note 8. 
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The plurality indulges in paternalistic comments about “pro-
found philosophic choices”; the “[woman’s] own destiny and personal 
dignity”; the “origins of the other human life that lie within the embryo”; 
the family as “society’s most intimate association”… and the desired 
assumption that “in most cases” the woman will receive “guidance and 
understanding from a parent.”127 
Some of this may be so “in most cases” and, it is to be hoped, in 
judges’ own and other warm and protected, nurturing family environ-
ments. But those “most cases” need not rely on constitutional protec-
tions that are so vital for others. I have cautioned before that there is 
“another world ‘out there’” that the Court “either chooses to ignore or 
fears to recognize.”128 
Part V’s location within Kennedy’s overall opinion is also tell-
ing. By encompassing Parts I–IV within a “natural theoretical” frame-
work, Kennedy sets up a judicial logic-based proof that readers can find 
security in and depend on (i.e., according to our case law, if you have 
A, B, and C, then you can prove law X is valid; D, E, and F clearly show 
A, B, and C; therefore law X is valid). What we get out of Akron, then, 
is traditional legal analysis (Parts I–IV) capped off with probative phil-
osophical language on the “bigger questions” concerning abortion (Part 
V). 
As one commentator suggests “. . . Kennedy’s struggle over 
abortion was not about whether to overturn Roe. It was about to how to 
modify and narrow Roe . . .”129 Given Kennedy’s Catholicism, however, 
it is hard to see this explicit “struggle” as merely philosophical in nature. 
The idea that Kennedy had trouble applying his liberty-based approach 
to judicial interpretation130 due to some mere internal academic colloquy 
seems suspect. A more realistic picture of Akron then would be to read 
Part V’s rhetoric as pointing towards how Kennedy’s Catholicism influ-
enced and shaped his personal views on the subject. 
Several factors support this interplay between religion and rhet-
oric in Akron. First, we know Kennedy was “struggling with the whole 
abortion issue” at the time Akron was being decided, and that he inten-
tionally sought to “convey that in what [he] wrote.”131 Second, based on 
Kennedy’s elaborate language in Part V, it seems fair to infer that his 
                                                            
127 Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 541 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
128 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted, and underlines added). 
129 COLUCCI, supra note 11, at 48. 
130 See id.; KNOWLES, supra note 90, at 178–79. 
131 COLUCCI, supra note 11, at 47–48 (quoting Blackmun Papers, Box 544, Folder 2 (letter 
dated June 21, 1990)) (on file with Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, 
D.C.)). 
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“struggle” with abortion was uniquely moral in nature, and, thus under-
standably influenced by his religious convictions. Third, given his Cath-
olic upbringing, the Catholic Church’s position on abortion, and extrin-
sic evidence on Kennedy’s personal repudiation of abortion, it is equally 
fair to assume that his religious views informed his moral objection, 
which, in turn, influenced his judicial writing style. As the next section 
shows, this subtle connection becomes more explicit as Justice Kennedy 
continues his mission to narrow Roe in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. 
IV. PLANNED PARENTHOOD V. CASEY 
If there is one case which illustrates both Justice Kennedy’s im-
portance as a “swing vote” and the import of his personal values in de-
ciding cases, it is Casey. 132 A 1992 abortion case out of Pennsylvania, 
Casey dealt with five provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control 
Act which restricted a married woman’s ability to have an abortion.133 
Besides the obvious implications on woman’s rights, the case was par-
ticularly relevant for its treatment of Roe v. Wade, the landmark 1973 
case which had previously affirmed a woman’s right to an abortion as 
constitutionally protected under the First Amendment.134 
Of the several provisions at issue in Casey one required that a 
woman seeking an abortion provide a signed statement that she has no-
tified her husband of her intention to have the procedure.135 Another 
specified that she be provided with certain information at least 24 hours 
before the abortion is performed.136 The underlying purpose behind 
these provisions mimicked those of Akron – to make it as hard as possi-
ble for a woman to have an abortion.137 While a general exception was 
made in cases of medical emergency, physicians nevertheless chal-
lenged the statutes as being at odds with the Court’s precedent in Roe.138 
Interestingly enough, at the time the Court heard the case it was 
more or less evenly split in terms of judicial ideology.139 Liberal justices 
such as Blackmun, Stevens and Souter, would have no issue upholding 
                                                            
132 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
133 Id. at 833, 844. 
134 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973), modified by Casey, 505 U.S. 833. 
135 Casey, 505 U.S. at 844. 
136 Id. 
137 See generally Casey Quinlan, Parental notification laws delay minors’ access to abortion 
care, study finds, THINKPROGRESS (Dec. 13, 2017), https://thinkprogress.org/parental-notifica-
tion-laws-delay-access-abortion-care-857ac91248fa/. 
138 Id. at 879–80. 
139 See JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE 
FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 151 (2007). 
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Roe in its entirety, and O’Connor’s voting record while on the Arizona 
legislature suggested she would follow suit. 140 Conversely, conservative 
Justices Scalia, Thomas, White and Chief Justice Rehnquist saw this as 
an opportunity to categorically overturn Roe v. Wade, which they 
viewed as an excessive use of judicial activism.141 As a result, there was 
clear and substantial pressure on Kennedy to alone – for all intents and 
purposes – decide what for many Americans was and remains a moral 
and religious question. 
The Court laid down its ruling on June 29, 1992 affirming the 
“core” holding of Roe, that a woman has a fundamental right to have an 
abortion.142 As Constitutional law scholar Helen Knowles notes, the plu-
rality shifted the abortion right’s constitutional foundations from pri-
vacy to liberty just as Justice Kennedy desired.143 In the process it re-
jected the rigid trimester framework of Roe and articulated an undue 
burden standard to allow for more state regulation of abortion.144 Recall 
that in Roe, the Court created the trimester framework in an effort to 
balance the fundamental right to abortion with the government’s two 
legitimate interests: protecting the mother’s health and protecting the 
“potentiality of human life.”145 In the first trimester, the Court left the 
decision solely to the woman and her physician.146 From the end of the 
first trimester until fetal viability, the state’s first interest in protecting 
the health of the mother would become “compelling” and the state could 
regulate the procedure if the regulation “reasonably relate[d] to the 
preservation and protection of maternal health.” 147At viability, which 
the Court believed to be in the third trimester, the state’s interest in “po-
tential life” would become compelling and it could regulate abortion to 
protect “potential life” and even forbid abortion barring certain 
health/life exceptions.148 
                                                            
140 See id. at 150–54. 
141 See TOOBIN, supra note 1, at 55 (referencing Scalia’’s pronounced intent to overturn Roe).’’ 
142 Casey, 505 U.S. at. 844–46 (“we are led to conclude this: the essential holding of Roe v. 
Wade should be retained and once again reaffirmed”). The Court also continued Kennedy’s 
trend of farming the right as a “liberty” right rather than a “privacy” right. See id. at 844 (show-
ing that the first word in the opinion is, in fact, “liberty”). 
143 See KNOWLES, supra note 90, at 181; see also COLUCCI, supra note 11, at 52–53. 
144 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 878–79. 
145 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973). 
146 Id. at 163. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
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To implement its holding in Casey the Court “rejected both 
Roe’s rigid trimester framework and the interpretation of Roe that con-
sidered all previability regulations of abortion unwarranted.”149 Instead 
it held that: 
Before viability, a State “may not prohibit any woman from 
making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy.” 
It also may not impose upon this right an undue burden, which 
exists if a regulation’s “purpose or effect is to place a substantial obsta-
cle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains 
viability.” 
On the other hand, “[r]egulations which do no more than create 
a structural mechanism by which the State, or the parent or guardian of 
a minor, may express profound respect for the life of the unborn are 
permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman’s exercise 
of the right to choose.”150 
But the decision was not without an unusual twist. The opinion 
was authored by three justices: O’Connor, Souter, and Kennedy.151 Alt-
hough the Court has never openly divulged exactly how it appropriated 
the writing duties between these three justices, one need not read very 
far into the opinion to make that determination. Indeed, commentators 
routinely attribute certain section to particular justices, often in conclu-
sory fashion.152 As Jeffery Toobin explains in The Nine: 
In their secret collaboration, Kennedy had agreed to write the 
opening section of the opinion, where they announced that they would 
preserve Roe. Souter would write next, about the importance of stare 
decisis, and O’Connor would write the final section, explaining why the 
spousal notification provision of the Pennsylvania law had to be struck 
down.153 
If we take Toobin’s widely accepted view, Parts I and II (pp. 
844-53 are attributable to Justice Kennedy, Parts III and IV (pp. 853-
879) to Justice Souter, and Part V (pp. 879-901) to Justice O’Connor.154 
Adopting this structure allows us to adequately narrow our focus on Jus-
tice Kennedy’s judicial writing style. 
                                                            
149 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007) (discussing Casey). 
150 Id. (discussing Casey’s “undue burden” test) (internal citations and quotation marks omit-
ted). 
151 Casey, 505 U.S. at 843. 
152 See, e.g., Terry Eastland, The Tempting of Justice Kennedy, THE AM. SPECTATOR (Feb. 
1993), https://spectator.org/the-tempting-of-justice-kennedy/ (taking it as a given that Justice 
Kennedy wrote Part I of the opinion). 
153 TOOBIN, supra note 1, at 54. 
154 The page attribution is based on Casey, 505 U.S. at 844–901. 
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IV-B. KENNEDY’S VOICE IN CASEY 
Justice Kennedy sets the tone of the opinion in the first line in 
classic grandiose fashion: “Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of 
doubt.”155 Consistent with the “religion-supernatural” category, the pro-
nouncement reads both powerfully and ominously, as if some divine 
command were to follow. In addition, Parts I and II of the opinion are 
sprinkled with additional suggestive language that build on his use of 
categories. After laying out the rule of the case, and reaffirming the es-
sential hold of Roe, Kennedy adds: 
[Passage I] At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own 
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of 
human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of 
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State (…) 
[Passage II] The destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large 
extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place 
in society.156 
Unlike his approach in Akron, Kennedy wastes no time infusing 
Casey with an eerie and metaphysical tone that continues through Parts 
I and II of the opinion.157 In what would on other occasions be mere 
dicta, then, Kennedy’s prose throughout the opinion provides fertile 
ground for exploring intersection of his personal beliefs and his role as 
a judge.158 A final passage from Part I further buttresses this perspective: 
[Passage III] Men and women of good conscience can disagree, 
and we suppose some always shall disagree, about the profound moral 
and spiritual implications of terminating a pregnancy, even in its earliest 
stage. Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our most 
basic principles of morality, but that cannot control our decision. Our 
obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral 
code.159 
                                                            
155 Casey, 505 U.S. at. 844. 
156 Id. at 851–52 (emphasis added). 
157 See id. at 844–53. 
158 In terms of precedential value, Justice Kennedy’s use of language here can be understood 
as dicta in the strict sense. Dicta typically refer to “statements in a judicial opinion that are not 
necessary to support the decision reached by the court.” See Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article 
III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2000 (1994). Similar to his use of the plurality section of Akron, 
Kennedy nevertheless utilizes powerful language in Casey in order to engage the reader, who, 
based on the topic at issue, is likely to be religious. Kennedy, himself a Catholic, aims to win 
over a religious audience by inducing it to accepting his logic as narrated within, what for many 
religious groups, is a familiar “religion supernatural” category. 
159 Casey, 505 U.S. at 850 (emphasis added). 
CANTARERO  
60 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 20:1 
Taking these passages together, four observations are immedi-
ately clear. First, Justice Kennedy clearly did not see resolution of the 
issue as a mere academic exercise160 but appreciated the real-world im-
pact both political and socially that his decisive vote would have. Se-
cond, we see traces of Kennedy’s own struggle to reconcile his personal 
views and his role as a judge with an obligation to uphold the rule of 
law. Here, Casey’s language is even more revealing than that of Akron. 
Whereas Kennedy’s limits his word choice to “profound philosophical 
choices” in Part V of Akron, for example, his use of the terms such as 
“spiritual” and “moral code” in Casey resonates more directly with a 
traditional Catholic mindset. Finally, Kennedy also exposes the reader 
to his particular hermeneutical approach to applying that law. 
Beginning with the first observation, Justice Kennedy paternal-
istic prose evidences a conscious effort to publicly acknowledge the im-
portance of an opinion affirming Roe v. Wade.161 His appreciation of this 
“great moral issue,” is expressed both in terms of breadth and magni-
tude. With respect to breadth, Justice Kennedy acknowledges the broad-
reaching implications of the decision. In Passage III, for example, his 
remark that “[m]en and women of good conscience can disagree, and 
we suppose some always shall disagree” recognizes that more than the 
litigant’s claims are at stake.162 Indeed, like Parts I–IV of Akron, Parts I 
and II of Casey are almost entirely void of any individualizing language 
specific to the petitioner or respondent in the case.163 
Passage I, likewise, deals with the latter issue of magnitude or 
how deeply the decision will impact those affected.164 Here Kennedy 
adds that “At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept 
of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human 
life.”165 He frames the category of inquiry as one of life’s “big ques-
tions,” which, in turn, has two effects. First, as mentioned, it appreciates 
the scale of the decision and the depth of its impact on the minds and 
hearts of all citizenry. Second, it frames the case as dealing with a “state 
                                                            
160 Recall that we also rejected this view as to Part V of Akron. See supra text accompanying 
note 129–30. 
161 This paternalistic language, moreover, is consistent with Kennedy’s earlier opinions oppos-
ing Roe. See, e.g., Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 541 (1990) (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting) (“The plurality indulges in paternalistic comments about ‘profound philosophic 
choices’ [and] the [woman’s] own destiny and personal dignity”) (internal citations omitted). 
162 Casey, 505 U.S. at 850. 
163 See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 507–19 (1990); Casey, 505 U.S. 
at 844–53. 
164 Akron, 497 U.S. at 5507-19; Casey, 505 U.S. at 844-53. 
165 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. 
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interest in morality,” whose boundaries must be set via judicial inter-
vention.166 
This latter point engrains the audience with Kennedy’s “super-
natural religious” narrative, requiring the reader to enlist “belief as an 
act of faith.”167 These great “mysteries” of “existence” are “beliefs” 
which may be right or wrong. Kennedy’s argument then is that the state 
should not assert what is “right” or “wrong” but rather defer to the 
Court’s judgment in erring on the side of extending human liberty rather 
than retracting it.168 He asks us to “trust” him that these “big questions” 
should be largely solved by each woman seeking an abortion.169 
Our second observation, that Justice Kennedy illustrates his own 
struggle to compromise on abortion, shifts the focus from a universal 
view to one centered on an individual character – Kennedy.170 Here, 
Kennedy continually supplements the “religious-supernatural” motif 
with additional ontological construction techniques.171 Kennedy, for ex-
ample, uses the terms “moral,” and “spiritual” no less than four times in 
Passages II and III alone.172 But these terms are also reinforced with op-
erative language; the phrases “principles of,” “imperatives,” and 
“code[s],” for example, all amplify the consequences of those “moral,” 
and “spiritual” beliefs.173 Justice Kennedy views the issue not as just one 
of law, but of religion which affects him personally.174 
Kennedy places himself at the center of the narrative when he 
writes that “Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our 
most basic principles of morality.”175 The use of the “us” pronoun is a 
clear break from the “men and woman…may disagree” language previ-
ously used. As the Blackmun papers show, Kennedy had a genuinely 
difficult time reaching his decision on abortion rights.176 This was espe-
cially true given that Kennedy had generally sided with conservatives 
in abortion cases such as Webster, Hodgson, and Akron in the years 
                                                            
166 See COLUCCI, supra note 11, at 48. 
167 See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 5, at 32. 
168 See COLUCCI, supra note 11, at 48. 
169 See id. 
170 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846–69. 
171 See id. 
172 See id. at 846–69. 
173 See id. 
174 See id. 
175 Id. at 850. 
176 See generally COLUCCI, supra note 11, at 38–58 (discussing the Blackmun paper in the con-
text of several abortion cases). 
CANTARERO  
62 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 20:1 
leading up to Casey.177 Notwithstanding this record, however, Kennedy 
still “struggled” with the issue on a personal level. As one commentator 
notes, for example, Kennedy had originally voted at to uphold the Penn-
sylvania requirements in conference, and only changed his mind after 
much internal reflection.178 What exactly brought him to that position is 
found in our third observation. 
One’s hermeneutic is fundamentally ones method of interpreta-
tion.179 Understood expansively, it is the way one chooses to approach a 
problem. Kennedy’s hermeneutical approach to moral issues in his ju-
dicial reasoning is cached in an often cited passage from Casey: “Some 
of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our most basic principles 
of morality, but that cannot control our decision. Our obligation is to 
define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.”180 
As the Blackmun papers suggest, this was perhaps one of the 
most difficult passages for Kennedy to write.181 Kennedy’s vote in Ca-
sey was a systematic shift from his jurisprudential stance on abortion in 
virtually all the prior cases.182 This “shift” is one that moved from an 
internal “struggle” in Akron (to reconcile his personal views with his 
judicial duty) to a clearer position in Casey which recognized that his 
subjective views on abortion had no business in deciding a Supreme 
Court case.183 Consequently, Justice Kennedy first builds up the im-
portance of moral issues within a “religious supernatural” framework.184 
He then amplifies that importance by putting his own struggle up for 
display. As a final act of judicial integrity he attests that despite “our” 
moral views, those views alone “cannot control our decision;” that re-
gardless of my, yours, or anyone’s “moral code,” the Court’s obligation 
is to define liberty for all, not just for Catholics, atheists or any other 
individual group that seeks to infiltrate the Courts decision-making pro-
cess by tapping into personal sympathies.185 Although Casey ultimately 
                                                            
177 Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 
417 (1990) (Kennedy, J. concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Ohio v. 
Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990) (Kennedy writing the majority). 
178 See COLUCCI, supra note 11, at 49. 
179 Hermeneutic, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/herme-
neutic (last visited Apr. 9, 2020). 
180 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992) (emphasis added). 
181 See COLUCCI, supra note 11, at 47 (quoting Blackmun Papers, Box 544, Folder 2 (letter 
dated June 21, 1990)) (on file with Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, 
D.C.)). 
182 See id.; Casey, 505 U.S. at 833–39. 
183 Compare supra text accompanying notes 101–04, with supra text accompanying notes 171–
79. 
184 See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 5, at 32. 
185 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 850–51. 
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did cut back on Roe, Kennedy’s internal transformation reflected, for 
him, a revival of a fundamental judicial principle – impartiality. 
Considering that Casey includes more religious-like language 
(“moral codes” and “spiritual imperatives”) than Akron (“philosophical 
choices”) we have all the more reason to view Kennedy’s rhetoric as 
being, at the very least, influenced by his Catholicism.186 Justice Ken-
nedy writes about “spiritual imperatives” and “moral codes” because 
these are the issues that came to his mind.187 Why they came into mind, 
this article suggests, is because Kennedy himself was dealing with them 
on a very real and personal level.188 He thus utilized the “supernatural 
religious” category to expand upon that “struggle” and, given his con-
clusion, perhaps end the debate for himself as to whether his personal 
“religious” view have any place in his opinion writing process.189 
Once again the question of whether readers buy into Kennedy’s 
“religious supernatural” narrative is open for debate. Justice Kennedy 
attempted not only to convey his own internal struggle in the opinion – 
a practice consistent with his prior opinions on abortion190 – but also his 
appreciation for each reader’s own potential ethical dilemma in accept-
ing his verdict. Key, however, is the fact that while this sympathy nar-
rative set aside pro-life views in the end, it did not totally abandon them. 
This is so because, despite Kennedy’s affirmation of the “fundamental” 
principle of Roe, the opinion in Casey changed Roe’s rigid trimester 
framework to the more relaxed undue burden standard espoused by Jus-
tice O’Connor.191 While the fundamental holding of Roe was retained, 
there is no doubt that the undue burden standard provided states with 
greater opportunities to restrict abortion in certain contexts.192 Thus 
while the lay reader may have bought into Kennedy’s narrative, a criti-
cal scholar would quickly understand this as just another compromise 
between a liberty-based approach to judicial interpretation and Ken-
nedy’s personal [religious] views. Here, Colucci’s remarks ring true that 
                                                            
186 See id. (writing that religious and moral codes cannot dictate the holding in this case). 
187 See Jelliff, supra note 9, at 119–20. 
188 See COLUCCI, supra note 11, at 46–47. 
189 See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 5, at 32. 
190 COLUCCI, supra note 11, at 46–47, n. 41 (Justice Kennedy writes in a handwritten note to 
Justice Blackmun “. . . I am still struggling with the whole abortion issue and thought it proper 
to convey this in what I wrote.”). 
191 See TOOBIN, supra note 1, at 57–59. 
192 See Gillian E. Metzger, Unburdening the Undue Burden Standard: Orienting Casey in Con-
stitutional Jurisprudence, 94 COLUMBIA L. REV. 2025, 2025–26 (1994). 
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“Kennedy’s struggle…was about how to modify and narrow Roe to al-
low for more democratic regulation of abortion while retaining it as a 
judicial enforceable liberty.”193 
V. GONZALES V. CARHART 
Having voted in favor of “parental-notification” laws in Hodg-
son and Akron, and after axing the “trimester framework” in Casey, Jus-
tice Kennedy’s next challenge came in the form of the controversial 
“partial-birth abortion” statutes.194 Whereas prior statutes generally fo-
cused on mandating or proscribing the actions of women, the “partial-
birth abortion” laws centered on preventing physicians from utilizing 
certain procedures in performing second-trimester abortions.195 The first 
of these cases was Stenberg v. Carhart, a 5-4 decision which struck 
down Nebraska’s criminal ban on a second-trimester procedure as an 
undue burden on a woman’s right to have an abortion.196 Specifically, 
the Court considered Nebraska’s ban on Dilation and Evacuation (D & 
E).197 This procedure entailed extracting a fetus from the womb through 
the cervix.198 In some cases the fetus could be removed more or less 
intact but often was removed piecemeal by having the physician make 
several “passes” through the cervix.199 
Consistent with his voting record in Akron and Casey, Justice 
Kennedy issued a dissenting opinion arguing that the Stenberg majority 
“repudiate[d]” the “central premise” of Casey that the “the States retain 
a critical and legitimate role in legislating on the subject of abortion.”200 
In the process, he exposed his own moral repulsion to the procedure by 
describing it in vivid detail.201 Here, for example, Kennedy adopted lan-
guage from the anti-abortion movement referring to the doctors as 
“abortionist[s]” thirteen times in his dissent and describing D & E’s as 
involving the “dismemberment,” “tearing,” and “dragging” of fetuses 
until they “[bleed] to death.”202 He emphasized this language within his 
                                                            
193 COLUCCI, supra note 11, at 48. 
194 See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921 (2000). 
195 See id. at 921–22. 
196 Id. 
197 See id. at 914–15. 
198 See id. at 921–22. 
199 See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 927 (2000). 
200 Id. at 956–57 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 883 (1992)). 
201 Id. at 958–60 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
202 Id. at 958–59. 
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larger moral framework of securing the State’s interest in preserving and 
promoting fetal life.203 
Justice Kennedy continued this graphic tone several years later 
in Gonzales v. Carhart when the Court reviewed a federal version of the 
Nebraska statute.204 Passed largely in response to the Court’s decision 
in Stenberg, the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 (“2003 Act”) 
differed from the Nebraska Act in two important ways. First, although 
both statutes applied to physicians and not women seeking the proce-
dure, only the 2003 Act included a scienter requirement on the part of 
the physician.205 Second, the 2003 Act was narrower in that it covered 
only a variation of the D & E procedure at issue in Stenberg, namely, 
“intact D & E’s.”206 As the Court elaborated “[t]he main difference be-
tween the two procedures is that in intact D & E a doctor extracts the 
fetus intact or largely intact with only a few passes”207 whereas the tra-
ditional D&E generally call for removing the fetus in pieces. The logic 
here was that “intact D & E’s” were closer to infanticide in that they 
often involved killing the fetus after a majority of its body was already 
outside the womb.208 
Once again assigned to write the opinion, Kennedy hoped to se-
cure a majority upholding the 2003 Act in his larger effort to continually 
narrow Roe’s imprint. With Justice O’ Connor (who held the decisive 
fifth vote in Stenberg) now replaced by a much more conservative Jus-
tice Alito, Kennedy again acted as a “swing vote” in yet another monu-
mental abortion case.209 As a result, and in a total shift from the 5-4 de-
cision in Stenberg, the Court in Gonzales v. Carhart ultimately upheld 
the federal ban on “intact D&E’s” in a bitter 5-4 split decision.210 Aside 
from its clear precedential value, the case adds to the conversation on 
Kennedy’s religion and judicial writing style not because of its particu-
lar structure (as with Akron’s two-tiered approach) or its pinning of 
                                                            
203 Id. at 979 (stating “The decision nullifies a law expressing the will of the people of Nebraska 
that medical procedures must be governed by moral principles having their foundation in the 
intrinsic value of human life, including the life of the unborn”). 
204 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
205 Id. at 148. 
206 Id. at 136–39, 150–53. 
207 Id. at 137. 
208 See, e.g., id. at 139 (“Some doctors performing an intact D & E attempt to remove the fetus 
without collapsing the skull. Yet one doctor would not allow delivery of a live fetus younger 
than 24 weeks because ‘the objective of [his] procedure is to perform an abortion,’ not a birth.”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
209 See Steven G. Calabresi, Substantive Due Process After Gonzales v. Carhart, 106 MICH. L. 
REV. 1, 3 (2008). 
210 See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 155–56. 
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women’s rights against society’s moral condemnation (as in Casey).211 
Rather, Justice Kennedy’s opinion again betrays his personal views on 
the issue with its vivid description of the procedure and heightened pa-
ternalistic language. Applying the same logic we used in assessing Ak-
ron and Casey, we can also see how this rhetoric reflects the deeper 
Catholic dogma that likely influences his personal leanings on the issue. 
The decision itself broke down into five sections. Part I starts 
with the Act, the policy behind it, and the procedural history leading up 
to the instant case.212 Part II sets up the applicable standard in a two-
page summary of Roe and Casey.213 Part III & IV apply the standard to 
the 2003 Act with Part III addressing the Act’s “operation and effect” 
214 and Part IV assessing whether it constitutes a “substantial obstacle to 
the woman’s effective right to elect the procedure.”215 Part V concludes 
by upholding the 2003 Act in its entirety.216 
Before discussing Kennedy’s vivid descriptions of the proce-
dure, it is worth noting that this overall structure of the opinion has a 
marked resemblance to that of Akron. Recall that in Akron Kennedy also 
began with a detail explanation of the statute followed by one giant 
IRAC with all the expected pieces: precedent, application, counterargu-
ments, and conclusion. However, it is Kennedy’s unique rhetoric that 
distinguishes the two cases in terms of style and substance, beginning 
which his description of various medical operations.   
First, unlike the dull, formal, and bureaucrat administrative ac-
tions at issue in Akron, or Casey for that matter, the 2003 Act focuses 
on much more intense, detailed, and visually-graphic medical proce-
dures, “intact D & E’s.” Kennedy capitalizes on this distinction to paint 
the surgery in the most negative light possible. Here, Kennedy starts not 
by copying and pasting the statute’s language into his opinion but by 
describing how the medical procedure it discusses is actually performed. 
Consider Kennedy’s discussion of the traditional and intact D & E’s at 
the beginning of his opinion: 
                                                            
211 The language of the Act at issue in Gonzales v. Carhart focused on the actions of the phy-
sicians who perform abortions not the women who seek them. As a result, Kennedy’s language 
in Carhart differs slightly from that of Casey where the statute at issue was specifically man-
dating or proscribing the action of women. See generally Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 
(2007). 
212 Id. at 133–45. 
213 Id. at 145–46. 
214 Id. at 146–56. 
215 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 156–67. 
216 Id. at 167–68. Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy also asserts that the facial chal-
lenges bought by the physicians were improper in the instant case and should never have been 
considered. He adds that in such cases an as-applied challenge would have been more appropri-
ate. Id. 
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[Traditional D & E:] After sufficient dilation…[t]he doctor, of-
ten guided by ultrasound…grips a fetal part with the forceps and pulls 
it back through the cervix and vagina, continuing to pull even after meet-
ing resistance from the cervix. The friction causes the fetus to tear apart. 
For example, a leg might be ripped off the fetus as it is pulled through 
the cervix and out of the woman. The process of evacuating the fetus 
piece by piece continues until it has been completely removed. A doctor 
may make 10 to 15 passes with the forceps to evacuate the fetus in its 
entirety . . .217 
[Intact D & E:] In the usual intact D & E the fetus’ head lodges 
in the cervix, and dilation is insufficient to allow it to pass… 
At this point, the right-handed surgeon slides the fingers of the 
left [hand] along the back of the fetus and “hooks” the shoulders of the 
fetus… 
While maintaining this tension…the surgeon takes a pair of 
blunt curved Metzenbaum scissors [and] carefully advances the tip, 
curved down, along the spine…[until it] contacts the base of the skull… 
Having safely entered the skull, he spreads the scissors to en-
large the opening. The surgeon removes the scissors and introduces a 
suction catheter into this hole and evacuates the skull contents. With the 
catheter still in place, he applies traction to the fetus, removing it com-
pletely from the patient.218 
Justice Kennedy dedicates six-full pages to describing both pro-
cedures in explicit detail.219 With respect to the second description, how-
ever, he clarifies the language as merely “an abortion doctor’s clinical 
description.”220 In order to get a clearer and more emotionally provoking 
view of the process he adds a second description from a nurse who wit-
nessed the same method performed on a 26 ½-week old fetus: 
Dr. Haskell went in with forceps and grabbed the baby’s legs 
and pulled them down into the birth canal. Then he delivered the baby’s 
body and the arms—everything but the head…. 
The baby’s little fingers were clasping and unclasping, and his 
little feet were kicking. Then the doctor stuck the scissors in the back of 
his head, and the baby’s arms jerked out, like a startle reaction, like a 
flinch, like a baby does when he thinks he is going to fall. The doctor 
                                                            
217 Id. at 135–36. 
218 Id. at 138 (citing H.R.Rep. No. 108-58, p. 3 (2003) (internal quotation omitted)). Here, Jus-
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performing the procedure. Id. 
219 See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 134–40 (Part I-A). 
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opened up the scissors, stuck a high-powered suction tube into the open-
ing, and sucked the baby’s brains out. 
Now the baby went completely limp….He threw the baby in a 
pan, along with the placenta and the instruments he had just used.221 
This last description differs strikingly from the prior two, with 
each more unsettling than the last. This imagery, moreover, fits within 
Kennedy’s “human narrative” of victimizing the fetuses and criticizing 
physicians. Tapping to society’s conception of the “indifferent” or “mad 
scientist” (perhaps a particular TV show or medical movie thriller 
comes to mind) Kennedy forces reader to choose between “innocence” 
and “impersonal;” between the “the poor defenseless infant” and the 
“stoic medical professional.” 
One similar thread between Akron, Casey, and Carhart is the use 
of rhetorical devices to amplify a particular category of thought. In Part 
I of Carhart, Kennedy adds to his “human narrative” by shifting his 
audiences’ ontological understanding of the case; in other words “cen-
tering” the facts to narrow the readers’ focus towards “fetuses as human 
beings” rather than “pregnant women as citizens with rights.”222  Con-
sider the nurse’s description. Here, Kennedy presents the startling image 
of an innocent “baby” with “little fingers” and “little feet” who “thinks” 
and “jerks” before having his [or her] “brains sucked out.”223 Juxtaposed 
to this image is the protagonistic physician who indifferently throws the 
“baby in a pan” after delivery – even alongside the very instruments just 
used to kill the unborn fetus.224 Thus, an “Act proscrib[ing] a method of 
abortion in which a fetus is killed just inches before completion of the 
birth process”225 becomes not only permissible but desirable. 
In addition to ontology, Kennedy touches on epistemology by 
pointing to the variety and uncertainty involved in “intact D & E’s.”226 
Epistemology concerns our scope of knowledge about what is “possi-
ble.”227 In one sense, Justice Kennedy utilizes this realm of inquiry as a 
way of building upon the readers’ fears as to what happens to the unborn 
in these cases. Sprinkled throughout Part I, for instance, are examples 
of what “some doctors” do; what “others” chose to do and what “may” 
occur as a result.228 This epistemological construction technique creates 
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225 Id. at 156–57. 
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fear, both in the terms of increasing distrust of physicians given the va-
riety of medical uncertainty involved in the procedure and with respect 
to how the fetuses are treated (some may be “torn apart” others “killed 
a few days before” to make the process easier, and still others have their 
“brains sucked out”).229 In the second sense, Justice Kennedy uses epis-
temology to discuss all the alternative procedures that fall outside the 
scope of the 2003 Act.230 Unlike the first sense, the purpose here is not 
fear but reassurance.  By discussing how many other procedures are 
available to women, readers are more likely to except this single prohi-
bition as an appropriate measure. In other words, he is saying “look, this 
act really won’t have as big effect as you all think, and given how hor-
rendous it is, we should ban it anyway.” 
For many readers trying to reconcile their personal views with 
the rights of women to access these services, this shocking presentation, 
viewed in light of the infinite variables at play, make physicians’ argu-
ments harder to digest and accept. Yet this may very well be exactly 
what Kennedy had in mind. In other words, by “humanizing” the fetus, 
Kennedy fully expects readers (or, more importantly, his colleagues) to 
have a harder time sympathizing with physicians on any “moral,” phil-
osophical, or even “spiritual level.” He thus implicitly frames the issue 
in Carhart as a struggle between humanized fetuses facing gruesome 
deaths at the hands of inhumane physicians.231 
Justice Kennedy compliments the above referenced rhetoric 
with his familiar paternalistic approach in Part IV of his opinion. After 
laying out Act’s language in full detail and articulating the applicable 
standard, Kennedy hones in on these pragmatic concerns. He does so, 
however, not at the “undue burden” stage but in his discussion of the 
“government’s interest” in banned “intact D & E’s.” Here, he begins 
with the pertinent State interests: 
There can be no doubt the government “has an interest in pro-
tecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession,” and “[an] in-
terest in promoting respect for human life at all stages in the preg-
nancy.232 
Kennedy next dives unashamedly into homily on the deep and 
dark nature of decisions concerning abortion and how the 2003 Act 
                                                            
229 Id. Another example is the variety of drugs which may be used depending on the stage of 
the pregnancy, the level of dilation achieved and various other factors. Id. 
230 Justice Kennedy utilizes this approach throughout Part I, for example, by mentioning the 
traditional D & E procedure in the beginning and other second-trimester procedures towards the 
end. See generally id. 
231 One can further distinguish this narrative with Justice Breyer’s approach in the Stenberg 
majority opinion. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
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serves to “protect” both women and, perhaps more important to Ken-
nedy, the fetuses: 
No one would dispute that, for many, D & E is a procedure itself 
laden with the power to devalue human life.233  
[I]t seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to 
regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sus-
tained.234 
It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice 
to abort must struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow more pro-
found when she learns, only after the event, what she once did not know: 
that she allowed a doctor to pierce the skull and vacuum the fast-devel-
oping brain of her unborn child, a child assuming the human form.235 
Kennedy employs two parallel rhetorical devices all three 
phrases. First, he sets up the epistemic framework by affirming the ve-
racity of each proposition at the beginning of the statement (underlined 
above).236 These self-serving phrases (“No one would dispute” and “It 
is self-evident”) lure readers into accepting the proposition before it has 
even been presented.237 He then hooks the reader in with emotionally 
sobering language (in italics) that mixes his “human narrative” with a 
more concerning “religious supernatural” tone (“devalue[ing] human 
life,” leads to a “struggle with grief” and “anguish and sorrow”).238 No 
longer does the struggle relate to Kennedy’s personal battle between 
liberty and personal belief (he clearly opposes this specific type of abor-
tion regardless of women’s rights) but rather frames it as woman’s in-
ternal conflict in dealing with the consequences of her decision (“some 
come to regret their decision”). Kennedy beats the reader over the head 
with this rhetoric eventually tying it into the overall legal basis for up-
holding The Act: 
[Because]…Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression 
in the bond of love the mother has for her child. 
[Because]…Whether to have an abortion requires a difficult and 
painful moral decision. 
[Because]…In a decision so fraught with emotional conse-
quence some doctors may prefer not to disclose precise details of the 
means that will be used[.] 
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[Then it follows that]…The State has an interest in ensuring so 
grave a choice is well informed. 239 
These passages relate to Kennedy’s Catholicism in several ways. 
First, given our reading of Akron and Casey, it is safe to say that Ken-
nedy’s language reveals his own moral leanings on the issue of abortion, 
and in particular to this specific form of abortion.240 This type of vivid 
explanation, for example, is totally absent from Breyer’s majority opin-
ion in Stenberg where the Court struck down the “partial-birth abortion” 
statute. 241  Although Kennedy exposed the reality of these procedures 
in his dissent in Stenberg, he made them the center of attention in Car-
hart v. Gonzales.242 In addition, the level of rhetoric devoted to painting 
the case as a moral issue with such “grave” and “profound” implications 
suggests that this moral aversion to the procedure has deeper roots in 
Kennedy’s Catholicism. Just in prior cases, one can read Kennedy’s lan-
guage as revealing his own moral agenda, which, in turn, is influenced 
by his religious beliefs. In this sense, Kennedy has increasingly empha-
sized the moral [and religious] dimensions of abortion cases to vote 
more and more in line with the Court’s conservative block and chip 
away at Roe in the process. 
CONCLUSION 
During his thirty-year tenure on the Supreme Court, Justice Ken-
nedy developed a unique moral flavor to writing judicial opinions; an 
approach which compliments his larger liberty-based approach to de-
ciding cases.243 As this article has attempted to demonstrate, this pro-
gression is evinced by Kennedy’s more publicized opinion concerning 
abortion: Akron, Casey, and Carhart.244 In addition, however, this article 
argues that Kennedy’s religious views influenced his opinion writing 
process in those landmark cases.245 With Blackmun papers as the start-
ing point, we know that Kennedy intentionally wrote to convey his own 
moral “struggles” on this sensitive issue.246 In addition, the three cases 
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discussed show how Kennedy grew more confident in exposing his per-
sonal leanings with each divisive opinion.247 Finally, based on what we 
gleaned regarding Kennedy’s religious beliefs and his personal views 
on abortion, we can safely infer that these “moral” pronouncements are 
to some degree influenced by his Catholic background.248 To be sure, 
we may never know conclusively whether Justice Kennedy’s Catholi-
cism “made the difference” in any of these cases. However, there is little 
doubt that it influenced his judicial writing process. 
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